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I.

Appealability
1.

Final Judgments
(a) Except where a direct review may be had in the

Supreme Court,

~

28

u.s.c.

§ 1252

(appeals from decisions

invalidating Acts of Congress where U.S. is a party), appeals
from all final decisions of the District Courts must be
prosecuted in the Courts of Appeals.

28

u.s.c.

§ 1291.

(b) "The classic definition of a final decision is one
which terminates the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing
for the court to do but execute the judgment."
Ed.

§

2 Fed. Proc. L.

3:306.
(c) The finality rule is designed to avoid fragmented

litigation, which clogs the appellate courts and causes
unnecessary delay in the trial courts.

2.

Partial F!nal Judgments
(a) "When more than one claim for relief is presented

in an action, • • • or when multiple parties are involved, the
[District Court] may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon

an express determination that there is no just reason for delay
and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment."
R. Civ. P. 54(b).

Fed.

The judgment then is appealable.

(b) The District Court must (1) indicate why there is
no just reason for delay and (2) expressly direct the entry of
partial judgment.

This certification process is reviewed on an

abuse of discretion standard.

Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General

Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1 (1980); Ansam Associates, Inc. v. Cola
Petroleum, Ltd., 760 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1985) (District Court
failed to provide sufficiently detailed explanation).

3.

Collateral Orders
(a) A collateral order is appealable if it:

(1)

conclusively determines a disputed question; (2) resolves an
important issue completely separate from, and collateral to, the
merits of the case; and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal.
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337

u.s. 541 (1949)

(order waiving the posting of security for costs);

~

Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424 (1985) Corders
disqualifying counsel are not collateral orders subject to
appeal).
(b) Denial of a public officer's claim of absolute
immunity in an action brought under 42
appealable before final judgment.

u.s.c.

§

1983 is

Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457

731 (1982); Minotti v. Lensink, 798 F.2d 607 (2d Cir. 1986).

u.s.

Denial of a claim of qualified immunity in a

§

1983 action, to

the extent it turns on an issue of law, likewise is appealable.
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985).

Cf. Group Health Inc.

v. Blue Cross Ass'n, 793 F.2d 491, 497 (2d Cir. 1986) (immunity
issues requiring resolution of factual questions).

4.

Interlocutory Orders
(a) Interlocutory orders granting or denying

injunctions; appointing receivers; and determining rights and
liabilities in admiralty cases are appealable of right.

u.s.c.

§

1292(a).

28

An order granting or refusing a stay of

arbitration proceedings is not a grant or denial of an injunction.
Greater Continental Corp. v. Schechter, 422 F.2d 1100, 1102 C2d
Cir. 1970).

(An order compelling or denying arbitration,

however, is appealable as a final decision under

§

1291.

C.A. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure
553 n.45.)

§

15
3914, at

The grant or denial of a temporary restraining order

is not appealable, except in very limited circumstances.
Proc. L. Ed.

§

19 Fed.

47:167.

(b) Where a non-final order involves "a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for
difference of opinion" and "an immediate appeal from the order
may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation," a District Judge may certify the order for
interlocutory review, subject to acceptance by the Court of

Appeals.

28

u.s.c.

§

1292(b).

The District Judge should give

reasons for the certification and should state more than a bare
finding that the statutory requirements have been met.

Isra

Fruit Ltd. v. Agrexco Agricultural Export Co., 804 F.2d 24 C2d
Cir. 1986).
(c) Although the extraordinary writs (certiorari,
mandamus and prohibition), 28

u.s.c.

§

1651 CAll Writs Act), are

not to be used as substitutes for appeals, they may be invoked in
exceptional circumstances to correct clearly erroneous rulings or
to supervise procedural decisions of the trial judge to whom the
writs are directed.

2 Fed. Proc. L. Ed. 3:367 et seg.

(d) A Court of Appeals having jurisdiction over an
appealable ruling may exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction
over an otherwise non-appealable order.

Port Authority Police

Benevolent Ass'n v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, 698
F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1983) (denial of class certification,
ordinarily unappealable, "inextricably related" to appealable
denial of preliminary injunction).

Acceptance of this

jurisdiction is entirely discretionary.

General Motors Corp. v.

Gibson Chemical & Oil Corp., 786 F.2d 105 C2d Cir. 1986).
(e)

All orders denying intervention are appealable in

the Second Circuit.

Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 606 F.2d 354,

357 (2d Cir. 1979).

Cf. Hispanic Society v. New York City Police

Department, 806 F.2d 1147 C2d Cir. 1986) (parties who did not
seek to intervene in District Court lacked standing to prosecute

appeal>.

An order denying intervention as of right (Fed. R. Civ.

P. 24(a)) and granting permissive intervention (Fed. R. Civ. P.
24(b)) subject to conditions is not appealable.

Stringfellow v.

Concerned Neighbors In Action, 55 U.S.L.W. 4299 (U.S. Mar. 9,
1987).

5.

Judgments Entered By Magistrates
(a) If the parties consent to trial before a

Magistrate, an appeal from a judgment entered at the direction of
the Magistrate is heard by the Court of Appeals.

28

u.s.c.

§

636(c)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 3.1 (eff. July 1, 1986).
(b) If the parties consent that the appeal of the
Magistrate's judgment be taken to a Judge of the District Court,
the District Court judgment is appealable only upon leave granted
by the Court of Appeals in the exercise of discretion.
§ 636(c}(4),

6.

28

u.s.c.

(5); Fed. R. App. P. 5.1 Ceff. July 1, 1986).

District Court Judgments in Bankruptcy Matters
(a) The District Courts have jurisdiction to hear

appeals from final judgments, orders and decrees of the
Bankruptcy Courts.

They also may hear appeals from interlocutory

orders and decrees by leave.

28 U.S.C. § 158(a), Bankr. R.

800l(a), (b).
(b) Appeals from the District Courts to the Courts of
Appeals in bankruptcy matters are governed by the rule of

finality.

28 u.s.c. § 158(d).

Accordingly, a District Court's

decision on an interlocutory matter in a bankruptcy proceeding
generally is not a final judgment for purposes of appeal to the
court of Appeals.

In re Stable Mews Associates, 778 F.2d 121 (2d

Cir. 1985) (District Court affirmance of interim award of
compensation to Chapter 11 Trustee acting as his own attorney
interlocutory in nature and not appealable).

7.

Agency and Tax Court Decisions
(a) The appealability of an Agency decision is governed

by the finality date rules established by the Agency.

Western

Union Telegraph Co. v. FCC, 773 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
(b) Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction to review the
decisions of certain Agencies in connection with applications to
enforce the orders of those Agencies (e.g., NLRB).

Fed. R. App.

P. 15(b).

(c) Appeal from a Tax Court decision should await the
entry of a formal document terminating the entire proceeding, and
disposition as to less than all tax years at issue in one case is
not appealable.

Estate of Yaeger v. C.I.R., 801 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.

1986); Fed. R. App. P. 13.

8.

Post-Judgment Motions
(a) Decisions on motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60

(Relief from Judgment or Order) are separately appealable under

an abuse of discretion standard.

In re Emergency Beacon Corp.,

666 F.2d 754, 760 (2d Cir. 1981).

Rule 60 allows the District

Court to correct clerical errors arising from oversight or
omission even after the judgment has been affirmed on appeal.
Panama Processes, S.A. v. Cities Service Co., 789 F.2d 991 (2d
Cir. 1986).
(b) Timely motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b)
(judgment n.o.v.), 52(b) (amendment of court's findings) and 59
(new trial and amendment of judgment) stop the time for appeal
from running, and no appeal may be taken until they are decided.
See Fed. R. App. P. 4<a>C4); Rados v. Celotex Corp., 809 F.2d 170
(2d Cir. 1987>

(notice of appeal considered a nullity when motion

for "reconsideration," treated as motion to amend judgment, was
pending).

II.

Scope of Review
1.

Findings of Fact
(a) Factual findings by the Court, whether based on

oral or documentary evidence, may not be set aside unless they
are clearly erroneous.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).

A choice between

two permissible views of the evidence cannot be clearly erroneous.
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470

u.s.

564 (1985).

(b) "[N]o fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to
the rules of the common law."

u.s.

Const. amend. VII.

This

provision is taken to mean that, where a motion for a judgment
n.o.v. was not made, the appellate court can only affirm or
remand for a new trial.

2 Fed. Proc. L. Ed.

§

3:650.

(i) A motion for judgment n.o.v. should be granted

only where there is such a lack of evidence that (i) the verdict
could have only been the result of sheer surmise or (ii> the
evidence is so overwhelming that reasonable people could not have
arrived at a verdict against the movant.

Mallis v. Bankers Trust

Co., 717 F.2d 683, 688-89 (2d Cir. 1983).

Denial of the motion

is reviewed in the Court of Appeals under the same standard.
Lopez v. McLean Trucking Co., 798 F.2d 611 C2d Cir. 1986).
(ii) The denial of a motion for a new trial is
reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard, but "[t)o the extent
that a new trial was sought on the ground that the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence, [the Second Circuit] ha[s]
disclaimed the authority to review a ruling on such a motion."
Newmont Mines Ltd. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 127, 133 C2d
Cir. 1986).

2.

Determinations of Law
(a) "An appellate court can reverse the determination

below for mere error in law, and does not apply the clearly
erroneous standard in reviewing determinations of law."
Proc. L. Ed.

§

3:652.

2 Fed.

(b) Errors and defects appearing in the record must be
disregarded if they do not affect the substantial rights of the
parties.

28

u.s.c.

§

2111 Charmless error rule).

Courts must

refuse to disturb orders and judgments unless such refusal is
"inconsistent with substantial justice."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 61.

(c) Admission or exclusion of evidence is not error
unless a party's substantial rights are affected and (1) a
specific objection is made in cases of admission or (2} an offer
of proof is made in cases of exclusion.

Fed. R. Evid. 103(a).

(d) Giving or failing to give an instruction to a jury
may not be assigned as error unless specific objection is made
before the jury returns.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 51.

In the. rare

instance, plain error in an instruction not objected to may be
ground for reversal to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
Williams v. City of New York, 508 F.2d 356, 362 (2d Cir. 1974).

3.

Administrative Agency Decisions
(a) Depending upon the type of agency action involved,

administrative agency fact-finding can be set aside as (1)
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or not otherwise in
accordance with law, 5
substantial evidence,

u.s.c. § 706(2)(A);
5 u.s.c. § 706(2)(E);

(2) unsupported by
or (3) unwarranted by

the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to a trial de
novo by the reviewing court, 5

u.s.c.

§

706(2)(F).

(b) In reviewing administrative agency action, the
reviewing court is charged with the duty of deciding all relevant
guestions of law, interpreting constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determining the meaning or applicability of the
terms of agency action.

5

u.s.c.

§ 706.

(c) Agency action violative of statutory provisions is
not in accordance with law and will be set aside.

Acemla v.

Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 763 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1985).

Cf. New

York Council v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 757 F.2d 502
(2d Cir. 1985) (expert tribunal generally entitled to deference
in construing its Enabling Act).

III.

Mechanics of Appeal
1.

Notice of Appeal
(a) Appeal as of right is taken by filing a notice of

appeal in the District court.

Fed. R. App. P. 3(a).

The filing

fee (currently $5) and the docketing fee (currently $65) are paid
to the Clerk of the District Court, who serves notice of filing
by mailing copies to counsel of record for each party other than
appellant.

The Clerk also transmits copies of the notice of

appeal and the docket entries to the Clerk of the Court of
Appeals.

Fed. R. App. P. 3 (d) , (e) .
(b) Notice of appeal as of right is filed within 30

days (60 days if federal government is party) after the date of

entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
4Ca)(l).

Fed. R. App. P.

A final judgment is not entered until a separate

document is filed.

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6); see Kanematsu-Gosho,

Ltd. v. M/T Messiniaki Aigli, 805 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1986).

If a

timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any other party may
file a notice of appeal within 14 days thereafter.

Fed. R. App.

P. 4(a)(3).
(c) Upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause,
the District Court may extend the time for filing a notice of
appeal as of right.

The motion to extend must be made within 30

days after the expiration of the time prescribed for filing a
notice of appeal, and the extension cannot exceed the later of 30
days beyond such time or 10 days from the entry of the order
granting the motion.

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5);

~In

re O.P.M.

Leasing Services, Inc., 769 F.2d 911 C2d Cir. 1985) (extension
denied for failure to show excusable neglect).
(d) Leave to appeal from a certified interlocutory
order (28

u.s.c.

§ 1292(b)) is sought by filing a petition with

the Clerk of the Court of Appeals within 10 days after entry of
the order in the District Court, with proof of service.

If leave

is granted, the necessary fees must be paid to the Clerk of the
District Court within 10 days of the order granting leave,
whereupon the appeal is docketed in the Court of Appeals.
R. App. P. 5.

Fed.

The same procedure obtains with regard to

permission to appeal from judgments entered upon direction of the

Magistrate (28

u.s.c.

§

636(c)(5)), except that the petition for

leave must be filed within the time allowed for filing a notice
of appeal as of right.

Fed. R. App. P. 5.1.

(e) A notice of appeal is filed with the Clerk of the
United States Tax Court within 90 days after the Tax Court
decision is rendered; if the notice is timely filed, any other
party may file within 120 days after the decision.
P. 13.

Fed. R. App.

A petition to review the order of an administrative

agency is filed with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals within the
time prescribed by the applicable statute.

Fed. R. App. P. 15(a).

An application for enforcement of an agency order also is filed
with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals.
2.

Fed. R. App. P. 15(b).

Record on Appeal
(a) The record on appeal consists of the original

papers and exhibits filed in the District Court, the transcript
of proceedings, and a certified copy of the docket entries
prepared by the Clerk of the District Court.
lO(a).

Fed. R. App. P.

The transcript, or such part as appellant deems

necessary, must be ordered from the Reporter within 10 days after
the notice of appeal is filed.

Fed. R. App. P. lO(b)(l).

See

CAMP R. 3.
(b) Unless the entire transcript is included, appellant
must file, within the 10-day period, a statement of issues to be
presented on appeal.

Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(3).

Where no

transcript is available, appellant may prepare and serve a

statement of the proceedings, subject to objection by the
appellee and approval of the District Court.

Fed. R. App. P.

lO(c).
(c) Any differences of the parties with respect to
whether the record discloses what occurred in the District Court
must be settled by the District Court.

Also, the Court of

Appeals may direct that omissions or misstatements be corrected
and may order a supplemental record to be certified and
transmitted.

Fed. R. App. P. lO(e).

(d) The court Reporter must furnish the transcript
within 30 days after receipt of the order therefor and must
request an extension from the Clerk of the Court of Appeals if
necessary.

Fed. R. App. P. ll(b).
(e) Local Rule 11 urges the parties to agree as to the

exhibits necessary for the determination of the appeal.

Failing

that, each party may designate the exhibits considered necessary,
and all non-designated exhibits remain with the District Court
Clerk unless requested by the Court of Appeals.

The Rule does

not relieve the parties of their obligations with respect to
preparation of the Appendix.
3.

The Civil Appeals Management Plan (CAMP)
(a) Within 10 days after filing the notice of appeal or

petition for review or enforcement, the appellant or petitioner
must file Form C or Form C-A (Civil Appeal Pre-Argument
Statement) with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals.

The following

are filed with the Clerk at the same time:

Form D (Transcript

Information) and copies of the judgment, order or decision
appealed from.

CAMP R. 3 (as amended Nov. 10, 1986).

(b) Staff counsel may direct the attorneys to attend a
pre-argument conference to explore settlement possibilities,
simplify the issues or discuss any matters related to the
expeditious disposition of the appeal.

CAMP R. 5.

Guidelines

for the conduct of pre-argument conferences have been adopted.
Conference discussions are confidential and may not be
communicated to any member of the Court.

In re Lake Utopia

Paper, Ltd., 608 F.2d 928 C2d Cir. 1979).
(c) As soon as practicable, staff counsel will issue a
scheduling order setting forth dates for the filing of the record
on appeal, briefs and appendix, and designating the week during
which the argument of the appeal will be heard.

CAMP R. 4.

The

dates prescribed by the scheduling order do not necessarily
conform to the filing dates set forth in the Fed. R. App. P.
See,

~~

Fed. R. App. P. 3l(a) (time for filing brief).
(d) Sanctions, including dismissal of the appeal, may

be imposed for non-compliance with orders and directions issued
pursuant to the Civil Appeals Management Plan.
4.

CAMP R. 7.

Motions
(a) The time and manner of making motions are governed

by Local Rule 27.

Notice of Motion Form T-1080 must be employed,

and a copy of the lower court or agency decision must accompany
the affidavits, memoranda of law and exhibits.
(b) Substantive motions normally are heard by the
regular panels sitting on Tuesday of each week, and oral argument
is permitted.

These motions include applications for dismissal

or summary affirmance; summary enforcement of agency orders; stay
or injunction pending appeal or review; and leave to proceed in
forma pauperis.

A single judge may hear substantive motions when

the court is in recess.
(c) On a motion for stay pending appeal, the moving
party must demonstrate a substantial possibility of success on
the merits, a likelihood of irreparable injury if the relief is
not granted, and that the stay will not harm another party or the
public interest.
1981).

Dubose v. Pierce, 761 F.2d 913, 920 (2d Cir.

The application ordinarily is made to the District court

in the first instance.

Fed. R. App. P. 8.

(d) Procedural motions generally are decided by a
single judge.

These motions include applications for

consolidation;

intervention~

substitution; extension of time to

file briefs; leave to file amicus

briefs~

filing oversized

briefs1 extending time for a petition for rehearing and similar
matters.

IV.

Appellate Advocacy
1.

The Brief

(a) The Brief must contain, in the following order:
(1) a table of contents, with page references, and a table of
cases (alphabetically arranged), statutes and other authorities,
referring to the page where they are cited; (2) a statement of
the issues presented; (3) a statement of the nature of the case,
the course of proceedings and the disposition below, followed by
a statement of facts with references to the record; (4) an
argument containing contentions, reasons and citations to
authorities and the record; (5) a conclusion stating the relief
sought.

Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)-(c).

Appellant's Brief must

include, as a preliminary statement, the name of the Judge or
agency member who rendered the decision and a citation to the
opinion, if reported.

2d Cir. R. § 28.

The form of the Brief is

prescribed by Fed. R. App. P. 32 and 2d Cir. R. § 32.
(b) Except by permission of the Court, principal Briefs
cannot exceed 50 pages and Reply Briefs cannot exceed 25 pages,
exclusive of pages containing the tables and any addendum
containing statutes, rules and regulations.
28(f), (g).

Fed. R. App. P.

Excessive footnoting should be avoided.

(c) If pertinent authorities come to the attention of a
party after the Brief is filed or after oral argument but before
decision, that party should promptly advise the Court by letter,
with a copy to opposing counsel, setting forth the citations.
Fed. R. App. P. 28(j).

(d) Parties should be referred to in the Brief by name
or description rather than "appellant" or "appellee."

Fed. R.

App. P. 2 8 (d) •
(e) Some deficiencies noted:

excessive quotations of

the record and authorities; inaccurate citations; typographical
and grammatical errors; outdated authorities; disorganized
arguments; failure to identify and distinguish adverse precedent;
lack of clarity; prolix sentences; uninformative point headings;
inadequate statement of the issues presented; incomplete factual
presentation; statement of the facts through summary of witness'
testimony rather than narrative; discussion of material outside
the record; use of slang; inclusion of sarcasm, personal attacks
and other irrelevant matters; excessive number of points; lack of
reasoned argument; illogical and unsupportable conclusions;
failure to meet adversary's arguments; failure to recognize that
the purpose of the Brief is to persuade.

2.

See 2d Cir. R.

§

28.

The Appendix
(a) The appellant is responsible for preparing and

filing the Appendix to the Briefs.

It must contain:

(1) the

docket entries in the proceeding below; (2) relevant portions of
the pleadings, charge, findings or opinion; {3) the judgment,
order or decision in question; (4) other parts of the record to
which the parties wish to direct the Court's attention.
Memoranda of law filed below should not be included.

Fed. R.

App. P. 30(a).

The form of the Appendix is governed by Fed. R.

App. P. 32.
(b) The parties are encouraged to agree on the contents
of the Appendix.

If they cannot, the appellant must serve on the

appellee a designation of the parts of the record to be included
and a statement of the issues to be presented, within 10 days
after the filing of the record.

The appellee then must designate

the portions of the record it desires to include, within 10 days
thereafter, and the appellant must include the parts so
designated.

Fed. R. App. P. 30(b).

(c) Unless the parties otherwise agree, the cost of
producing the Appendix must be paid initially by appellant.

If

the appellant considers the items designated by appellee
unnecessary, the appellee must be so advised and must then
advance the costs of including those items.

The cost of

production is taxed as costs, except that the cost of producing
unnecessary items may be imposed on the requesting party.

Local

Rules may provide for sanctions to be imposed upon "attorneys who
unreasonably and vexatiously increase the costs of litigation
through the inclusion of unnecessary material in the appendix."
Fed. R. App. P. 30(b) (although the Second Circuit has not yet
adopted such a rule, these sanctions have been imposed under the
Court's inherent powers).
(d) An alternative method, allowing for deferred
preparation of the Appendix, is provided, and the Appendix may be

dispensed with altogether in a limited class of cases.
App. P. 30(c); 2d Cir. R.

§

30.

Fed. R.

When exhibits are designated for

inclusion, they may be bound in a separate volume, suitably
indexed with a description of each exhibit.
30(e); 2d Cir. R.

§

Fed. R. App. P.

30.

(e) Preparation of an appropriate Appendix is an
important factor in successful appellate advocacy.
Underinclusion is just as serious a deficiency as overinclusion.
Frequently, Briefs refer to matters in the record that are not
included in the Appendix.

This creates an unfavorable impression

on the Court.

3.

Oral Argument
(a) Although the Court is authorized to dispense with

oral argument in certain cases, 2d Cir. R.

34(g), the custom in

§

the Second Circuit is to allow it whenever requested.

Time

requests are passed on by the presiding Judge, and the time
currently allowed to each side averages 10-15 minutes. Appellant
may reserve time for rebuttal.
Judges.

Argument is heard by a panel of 3

Once a case is set for oral argument, there may be no

continuance, except by order of the Court on good cause shown.
Engagement of counsel (other than in the Supreme Court) is not
good cause.

Fed. R. App. P. 34; 2d Cir. R.

§

34.

(b) Oral argument is a very important element of
appellate advocacy and should not be waived.

It presents an

important opportunity to persuade the Court.

The Second Circuit

is a "hot bench" and the Judges welcome the opportunity to
clarify their thinking and that of their colleagues through the
interchange with counsel.

A Judge's tentative conclusions about

a case have been "turned around" on many occasions by oral
argument.
(c) Some deficiencies noted:

reading from a prepared

text; quoting extensively from a case or from the record;
deferring answers to questions; referring to the Brief rather
than responding directly to the inquiry; unpreparedness; lack of
familiarity with precedential cases decided since the filing of
the Briefs; excessive discussion of the facts; lack of
familiarity with relevant facts; unnecessary discussion of basic
legal principles; unfamiliarity with cases cited; responding with
a "guess"; lack of a structured argument; ineffective
presentation of the issues; insufficient voice volume;
distracting mannerisms; answering questions with

questions~

attempting to cover too many points; emotional arguments.

4.

Sanctions
(a) The prevailing party may be awarded just damages

and double costs for delay or for a frivolous appeal.
§ 1912~

Fed. R. App. P. 38.

28 U.S.C.

An attorney who multiplies the

proceedings unreasonably and vexatiously may be liable for excess

costs, expenses and attorney's fees attributable to such conduct.
28

u.s.c.

§

1927.

(b) Sanctions, including dismissal, may be imposed for
failure to comply with time limitations or any rule or order
related to the appeal.

2d Cir. R. § 38; CAMP R. 7.

The sanction

provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 apply to motions in the Court of
Appeals as well as in the District Court.

In re Martin-

Trigona, 795 F.2d 9, 12 C2d Cir. 1986).

v.

Decision Making
1.

Initial decision making
(a) The average time for processing appeals in the

Second Circuit is 6 months, the fastest in the nation.
Report of the Second Circuit Executive.

See 1986

A decision may come in

the form of a written opinion or a suoonary order.

Decisions may

be announced from the Bench, but such dispositions are rare,
except in the case of argued motions.
formal opinions and are unreported.

Summary orders are not
Since they are considered to

serve "no jurisprudential purpose," they may not be cited or
otherwise referred to in unrelated cases before the Second
Circuit or any other court.

2d Cir. R.

§

0.23.

(b) Tentative votes are taken at conferences held
immediately following oral argument or at the end of the week.
Voting memoranda, giving reasons for the tentative votes, are
exchanged in a number of cases.

Writing assignments are made by

the senior active Judge, unless that Judge dissents, in which
case the assignment is made by the next senior active Judge.
Drafts of opinions and summary orders undergo extensive review by
panel members, and positions frequently are re-aligned.

Summary

orders generally are not used in cases of reversal, and any panel
member may object to decision by summary order.
(c) In arriving at a decision on a question of state
law, the Second Circuit now may certify the question to the New
York Court of Appeals.

N.Y. Rules of Court§ 500.17 (N.Y. Ct.

App.); see Kidney v. Kalmar Laboratories, Inc., 808 F.2d 955 (2d
Cir. 1987}.
on motion.

Certification may be made by the

court~

2d Cir. R. § 0.27 (added Nov. 10, 1986).

sponte or

Acceptance

of the question is discretionary with the New York Court.
(d) Following receipt of the opinion or order, the
clerk enters judgment and, on the same date, mails copies of the
opinion or order to the parties.

Fed. R. App. P. 36.

The

mandate issues 21 days thereafter, unless the time is shortened
or enlarged by order.

Fed. R. App. P. 41.

must be filed within 14 days after judgment.

The bill of costs
Procedures relating

to taxation of the bill of costs are set forth in Fed. R. App. P.
39 and 2d Cir. R. § 39.

2.

Post-judgment decision making
(a) The decision-making process may continue with a

petition to the panel for rehearing, which must be filed within

14 days after entry of judgment unless the time is shortened or
enlarged by order.

The petition must particularize the points of

law or fact petitioner contends were overlooked or misapprehended
in the opinion.

Oral argument is not ordinarily permitted, and

no answer to the petition will be received unless required by the
Court.

If a petition for rehearing is wholly without merit, a

sum not exceeding $250 may be taxed as additional costs against
the petitioner.

Fed. R. App. P. 40; 2d Cir. R.

§

40.

(b) The petition for rehearing may also contain a
"suggestion" for rehearing in bane.

The vote of a majority of

the Circuit Judges in regular active service is necessary to
secure in bane consideration.

An appeal or other proceeding may

be heard in bane initially, but in bane hearings generally are
disfavored.

They are limited to cases where consideration by the

full Court is necessary to maintain uniformity of decisions and
where questions of exceptional importance are involved.

Fed. R.

App. P. 35; 2d Cir. R. § 35.
(c) Issuance of the mandate is stayed upon timely
filing of a petition for rehearing.
the mandate issues 7 days thereafter.

If the petition is denied,
A further stay may be

sought by motion on notice pending application for writ of
certiorari to the
Cir. R.

§

41.

u.s.

Supreme Court.

Fed. R. App. P. 41; 2d

The pendency of a suggestion for a rehearing in

bane does not automatically stay the mandate.
35(c).

Fed. R. App. P.
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Chief Judge Munson of the Northern District, under whom I
was privileged to serve as a District Judge, never has thought
much of the appellate process.
does).

(I guess that no District Judge

He says that appellate judges are like soldiers who come

onto the battlefield after the battle and shoot the wounded.

He

claims that he read a dissenting opinion in my court that went
something like this:

"I dissent, substantially for the reasons

given in the majority opinion."

He also claims to have read a

concurring opinion written in these words:

"I concur in so much

of the majority opinion as is supported by the reasoning therein
and dissent from the remainder."

Judge Munson told me that he

heard about the argument of an appeal involving one of my
decisions as a District Judge.
began:

The attorney for the appellant

"May it please the court, this is an appeal from a

decision by Judge Miner."

The presiding judge supposedly said:

"Get on to your next point."

Speaking at the ceremony marking my

departure from his District Court to serve as a Judge of the .
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Judge Munson was heard
to remark that both courts undoubtedly would benefit from the
event.
Regardless of how district judges such as Judge Munson
regard the appellate process, it is incumbent upon lawyers
practicing in the Federal Courts in New York to become familiar
with civil appellate practice in the Second Circuit.

To that

end, I have prepared the outline that appears in your coursebook.

I

\

The outline is perhaps more detailed than necessary, but the
materials are quite up to date and replace the more sketchy
outline of this subject previously published by the State Bar.
The outline covers a number of current issues and is divided into
five parts:
pages

Appealability, at pages

289-291~

285-289~

Mechanics of Appeal, at pages

Scope of Review, at
291-294~

Appellate

Advocacy, at pages 294-298 and Decisionmaking at pages 298-299.
Also included is a list of Suggested References at page 300.
My discussion this afternoon will focus on current and
recurrent problems relating to two items covered in the outline:
Appealability and Appellate Advocacy.

With respect to the

question of what is, and what is not appealable, there are sharp
differences from New York State practice, and it behooves the
practitioner to be familiar with those differences.

With respect

to appellate advocacy, it suffices at this point to say that I
have been greatly disappointed in much of the written and oral
argument recently presented to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals during my sittings.

By restricting my comments to these

two topics, I hope to have some time for any questions you may
have regarding civil appeals in the Second Circuit.
Appealability.

A number of judgments and orders brought

before our Court are dismissed each year simply because they are
not appealable.

Very frequently, our staff counsel will bring to

the attention of attorneys at a conference, held pursuant to our
Civil Appeals Management Program, that a particular judgment or

order is non-appealable.

I understand that this can be very

embarrassing for the attorneys involved.

Research into the

question of appealability, before the notice of appeal is filed,
is strongly recommended.

In determining what is appealable, we

frequently refer to the rule of finality.

Does the rule require

a decision to be final, to the extent of ending all phases of the
litigation on the merits, before an appeal may be taken to the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals?

The answer to that question is

generally "yes," rarely "no" and sometimes "maybe."
Generally, appellate review is not available until the final
judgment, resolving all the claims, cross-claims, counterclaims,
consolidated claims and defenses in a case is entered.

28

u.s.c.

j

\

§ 1291 requires the prosecution in the Court of Appeals of all

final decisions of the district courts.

Let me give you some

common examples of orders that are non-final and therefore not
appealable:

I

I
d)

RESULT OF NON-COMPLIANCE- Failure to timely file Forms
C & D results in automatic dismissal of the appeal by
the Clerk of the Court of Appeals. Upon a showing of
good cause, accompanied by the required Forms, reinstatement is usually granted, but counsel is advised
to avoid the risk.

B. Substantive Requirements
1.

(

Finality- 28 USC §1291, Rule 54(b), FRCP
in general, a final judgment, completely resolving all
of the claims raised in a single case or consolidated
proceeding, must be ente~ed·before appellate review is
available. Thus, if any claim, portion of a claim,
counter-claim or cross-claim remains pending, a judgment on any other claim is not considered "final."
This federal rule of "finality" contrasts sharply with
New York State court practice.· Under Rule 54(b) FRCP,
a District Judge does have discretion to direct entry
of judgme~t on a discrete claim, though not on a portion of a single claim, see, Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co. v. Giesow, 412 F. 2d 468, 470 (2d Cir. 1969); but
the District Court must provide,_ in light of the strong
policy against piecemeal appeals announced in Ansam v.
COLA, 760 F. 2d 442 (2d Cir. 1985), a "brief, reasoned
explanation" of why there is no "just reason for delay."
NOTE: Interlocutory appellate review is available, by
leave of court, under 28 USC §1292(b), to resolve controlling questions of law, but leave to appeal must be
obtained from both the District Court and the Court of
Appeals.
NOTE: In extraordinary (rare) circumstances, appellate
review of non-final orders can be had via mandamus.

V Listed below are examples of orders which have been con'"-.• sidered to be non-final, and hence,_ not appealabl·e.
- discovery orders. See, Xerox Corp. v. SCM Corp.,
534 F. 2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1976)
-an order granting a new trial. See, Compaenie Nat'! v.
Port of N.Y. Authority, 427 F. 2d 951, 95
(Zd Cir. 1970)
- an order dismissing a complaint with leave to replead
or amend. See, Elfbein v. Gulf & Western, 590 F. 2d
445, 448 (2d Cir. 1978)
- an order denying a motion to dismiss a complaint or
for summary judgment. See, Pacific Union Conference
v. Marshall, 434 U.S. 1305, 1306 U977); Alart Assoc.
v. Aptaker, 402 F. 2d 779 (2d Cir. 1968); RRI Realty
v. Inc. Village of Southampton, 766 F. 2d 63 (2d Cir 1985)
EXCEPTION: Rejection of a government official's defense

(

I
of absolute immunity or qualified immunity, on a legal ground
as opposed to a factual basis, is appealable, because defendant
is entitled to be free from suit:;"" not just liability in damages.
See, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 105 S. Ct. 2806(1985). QUERY: Whether
interlooA:ory review is available to defendant if plaintiff has
sought both damages individually and equitable relief against
the official in his official capacity. See, Bever v. Gilbertson,
724 F. 2d 1083 (4th Cir. 1984)(no review); Schwartz, Public
Interest Litigation -Appeals From'Denial Of Immunity, NYLJ
Dec. 16, 1986.
-an order_,finding liability only, reserving for future deter-.'
mination the amount of damages:·l See, Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.,
424 u.s. 737,744.
.
EXCEPTION - Ordering the delivery of real property, which can
create an irreparable injury,,may be appealable. Compare, Forgay
v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 204 (1848), with In Re MartinTrigona, 763 F. 2d 135 (2d Cir. 1985).
-an order awarding interim attorneys' fee1. See, Hastings v. MaineEndwell, 676 F. 2d 893 (2d Cir. 1982); In Re Stable Mews Assoc.,
778 F. 2d .i21 (2d Cir. 1985). But see, Falvey, Significant Developments In The· Law, NYLJ May 29, 1986 (discussing Rule 11 cases
in 7th cTr.and----o:-c. Cir.)
- an order not followed by entry of a "judgment'J. See, Kanematsu- ·
Gosha v. M/T Messiniaki,
F. Zd
, 86-7610 (2d Cir. Nov. 7,
1986). Under FRAP 4(a) (2)-;-a noticeCif appeal filed after announcement of a decision, but before entry of judgment, is treated as
filed on the date of the judgment. But make sure to get a j~dgment.
-an order by a District Judge staying his own proceedingi.
NOTE: lh Moses H. Cone Memoria 1 Hospi ta 1 v. Mercury Canst r. Co.,
460 U.S. 1, 11 n.ll (1983), the Courtheld that a stay order is
final, and hence appealable, "when the sole purpose and effect
of the stay are precisely to surrender jurisdictidn of~ federal
court to state court.·" Thus, federal abstention in favor of state
court adjudication, which effectively ensures under principles
of res judicata, that there would be no further litigation in a
federal forum, constitutes a surrender af jurisdiction which is
appealable. In contrast, a decision not to abstain is not a
·
final, appealable decision. RRI Real~v. Inc. VillageCif Southamption, 766 F. Zd 63 (2d Cir. 1985)
-an order fully resolving the merits, but not resolving the issue
of attorneys' fees, is not appealable in only two ins·tances: in
a stockholder derivative-iction, where the fees come out of the
common fund, see,_ Lewis v. S.L. & E Inc., 746 F. 2d 141 (Zd Cir.
1984}; and where attorneys' fees are.contractually stipulated,
see, Krear v. Nineteen Named Trustees, 77h F. Zd 1563 (Zd Cir.
1985). In all other instances, where fees are based upon a feeshifting statute, or Rule 11, or upon inherent authority upon a
finding of "bad faith", a timely notice of appeal from judgment
on the merits must be filed even though fees remain unresolved.
See, White v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 445, 452 n.14 (1982);
Ellender v. Schweiker, 781 F. 2d 314 (Zd Cir. 1986).

-4-

During my tenure as a New York State Supreme Court Justice,
I found that a plaintiff had taken the trouble to appeal an order
of mine directing compliance with one item in a bill of
particulars.

Aside from the fact that there are no bills of

particulars in federal practice, such an appeal would be
impermissible under our appellate procedure.

As I have indicated

previously, however, there are some limited exceptions to the
rule of finality.

28 U.S.C. § 1292Ca) provides a statutory

appeal as of right from interlocutory orders granting or denying
injunctions, appointing receivers and determining rights and
liabilities in admiralty cases.

The right to appeal from a grant

or denial of an injunction order is a little tricky.
example:

For

While an order compelling or denying arbitration is

appealable as a final decision under § 1291, an order granting or
refusing a stay of arbitration proceedings is not considered a
grant or denial of injunction under§ 1292(a).

An order refusing

to stay proceedings in the district court pending arbitration is
considered an appealable interlocutory order refusing an
injunction, if the underlying action is legal, rather than
equitable, in nature.

Here is a recent cite on that:

Gilmore v.

Shearson-American Express, 811 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1987).

Very

recently, we held that preliminary relief afforded by the
district court under the provisions of a statute was not an
injunction of the type contemplated by§ 1292(a).

Only orders

issued pursuant to the equity powers of the district court
qualify.

The case is Korea Shipping Corp. v. New York Shipping

Association, 811 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1987).
A fairly sure-fire way to avoid the rule of finality is to
get the district judge to direct the entry of a partial judgment
-- that is a final judgment affecting one or more but fewer than
all of the claims or parties.

I say fairly sure-fire because you

must have the district judge make an express determination that
there is no just reason for delay and expressly direct the entry
of the partial judgment.

The district judge must say why there

is no just reason for delay, and we may refuse to accept the case
for review if the explanation given is lacking in the necessary
detail.

We do apply a light standard of review to these partial

judgment certifications, however, -- abuse of discretion.

The

entire process is governed by the provisions of Rule 54(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

A very recent decision of ours

involving the standards for Rule 54(b) certification is Cullen v.
Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 710-712 (2d Cir. 1987), decided in
February.
A much less certain way to gain review of a non-final order
is found in the certification procedure set out at 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b).

To utilize that procedure, the district judge must

determine that the order involves a "controlling question of law
as to which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion" and "an immediate appeal from the order may materially

advance the ultimate termination of the litigation."

As is

apparent, only a novel question of law is adequate to invoke this
procedure and then only if the conclusion of the litigation can
be hastened by resolution of that question.

The certification is

subject to acceptance by the Court of Appeals, and acceptance is
rare.

As a district judge, I invoked the statute but once, and

the question was rejected by the Circuit Court.
Reviewable collateral orders of the type discribed in Cohen
v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., are few and far between.
Such orders must satisfy a three-fold test:

They must

conclusively determine a disputed question, resolve an important
issue completely separate from, and collateral to, the merits of
the case, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal.
reluctant to find all three conditions satisfied.

Courts are

Cohen itself

involved an order waiving the posting of security for costs.
While the Cohen collateral order exception to the rule of
finality was judicially created about forty years ago, another
exception has only recently been engrafted on the rule by the
courts.

The new exception allows immediate appeal from the

denial of motions to dismiss or for summary judgment in civil
rights claims against public officers who have raised the defense
of absolute or qualified immunity.

42
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§ 1983 allows

claims against those who, acting under color of state law,
deprive a person of a right, privilege or immunity guaranteed by
the Constitution or by a statute of the United States.

A

defendant who raises the claim of absolute immunity, such as a
judge (I have been sued several times by disgruntled litigants)
is considered entitled to have the rejected defense determined on
appeal immediately to avoid the inconvenience of trial, if
possible.

Likewise, those who have the defense of qualified

immunity, such as police officers who claim to have acted in good
faith, may have appeals from denials of this defense heard
immediately if the resolution of factual issues is not required.
For example, if a police officer conducted a search in a
generally judicially-approved manner thereafter held to be
unconstitutional, it might be said that there was a good faith,
qualified immunity defense as a matter of law.
While all orders denying intervention (of right or
permissive) are appealable in the Second Circuit, the Supreme
Court held a few weeks ago that an order denying intervention of
right but granting permissive intervention subject to conditions
is not appealable.
An arcane rule to bear in mind is the rule of pendent
appellate iurisdiction.

This rule has nothing to do with state

claims appended to federal claims as in the pendent jurisdiction
of a district court.

It deals with our exercise of jurisdiction

over an otherwise non-appealable order which appears in the
record before us along with an appealable order.
caution:

A note of

Pendent appellate jurisdiction is purely discretionary,

and I was a member of a recent panel that exercised its
discretion to reject the pendent question.
I think that I have hit most of the highlights of
appealability and do wish to move on to appellate advocacy.

I

refer you to the outline for the rules on appealability of
judgments entered by magistrates (some new provisions here),
district court judgments in bankruptcy matters, agency and tax
court decisions and post-judgment motions.
respect to post-judgment motions:

Just a word with

While timely motions for

judgment n.o.v., for amendment of the court's findings, and for
new trial or amendment of judgment stop the time for appeal from
running until they are decided and are not separately appealable,
a direct appeal may be taken from a decision on a motion for
relief from a judgment or order brought under Rule 60 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Now to Advocacy.

A few years ago, then Chief Justice Burger

made some comments about the low state of trial advocacy in the
United States.

I don't know how he came to the conclusions he

did, because the court he was sitting on does not have a very
good view of trials.

From my own experience on the trial bench,

New York State Supreme Court and United states District Court,
trial lawyers generally do an adequate, often an outstanding job,
in representing their clients at the trial level.
has been much different as an appellate judge.

My experience

Frankly, I am

amazed at the poor quality of the briefs and oral arguments I

frequently am confronted with at the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals.

It is with a great deal of self-interest, therefore,

that I share with you some observations, warn you of some
pitfalls and offer you some suggestions respecting appellate
advocacy in the Second Circuit.
First, the Brief.

In the beginning of the Republic, the

Brief was merely an adjunct to unlimited oral argument.

I was

able to get some of the flavor of those times when I sat with a
Court of Appeal in England.

The briefs there were not much more

than a list of applicable precedents and authorities, but the
oral argument proceeded at a leisurely pace, with many questions
and answers.

The sheer bulk of cases makes it impossible to

proceed before our Court in this manner.

Appellate argument is

strictly limited, and it is important that the Brief be as
persuasive as possible.

It should never be forgotten that the

purpose of all appellate advocacy is to persuade.
Just this past week, I read two Briefs that provided a study
in contrasts.

One brief included six separate points, each point

written on one page.
one of the points.

There were no citations of authority in any
The other Brief was chock-full of citations

citations to Supreme Court cases, Circuit Court cases and even
to some state cases.

Each and every one of the citations was

totally unrelated to the case on appeal.

Try to give some

authorities in the Brief, but make sure they're in point.

Every once in a while, we find a Brief containing a fine
argument, supported by law and logic, on some arcane point of law.
Unfortunately, we can't consider the point, because it was not
raised below.

An issue not raised in the district court cannot

considered in the Court of Appeals.

Grace Towers Tenants

Association v. Grace Housing Development Fund, 538 F.2d 491, 495
(2d Cir. 1976).

The principal was reiterated in a decision

issued by a panel of my court two weeks ago.

Christensen v.

Kiewit-Murdock Investment Corp., No. 85-7964, slip opinion
decision March 26, 1987.

These two citations probably should be

added to the Scope of Review section of my outline (Part IIJ.

No

matter how good the point is, don't include it in the Brief if it
isn't raised at the trial level.
There is no reason to present a Brief loaded with inaccurate
citations, typographical and grammatical errors and citations to
outdated authorities.

Yet we frequently see Briefs containing

one or more of these deficiencies, any one of which will cause
the Brief writer to lose credibility with the court.

The

standard format of a Brief is prescribed by the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure and the Rules of our Circuit, and we insist
on strict adherence to that format.

Failure to adhere to the

format may be cause for rejection of the Brief in the Clerk's
office or by the staff attorneys.

If a Brief in improper form

gets past them, it will certainly lose you points with the panel
hearing your case.

Principal Briefs cannot exceed fifty pages and reply Briefs
cannot exceed twenty-five pages.

We adhere strictly to those

requirements, although there is such a thing as a motion to file
an oversized Brief.

We take a dim view of those who attempt to

increase the number of words in the Brief by extensive use of
footnoting.

Avoid this annoyance!

We don't look for a prize-winning literary style in a Brief.
We do expect clarity, well-organized argument and understandable
sentence structure.

All too often we find rambling narratives,

repetitive discussions and conclusions unsupported by law or
logic.

A Brief is different from most other forms of writing in

that it has as its only purpose the persuasion of the reader.
This should be borne in mind at all times.
The statement of facts is a very critical part of the Brief.
It should not be incomplete, nor should it be too lengthy.

It

should cover only those facts necessary to the development of the
legal issues in the case.

A bad habit of some lawyers is to list

the name of each witness, followed by a summary of his or her
testimony.

A narrative of the facts is much preferred.

In the narrative of the facts, as well as in other portions
of the Brief, it often is necessary to refer to testimony or
exhibits.

The testimony or exhibits referred to should be

included in the Appendix.

Make sure that they are included!

There is nothing quite so frustrating to me as to find some
reference in the Brief to a piece of evidence that is not

included in the Appendix.

I must then go to the original record

in our clerk's office or possibly back to the district court
clerk's office to find what I am looking for.

The form and

development of the Appendix is discussed in the outline under
Appellate Advocacy for a good reason.

I urge you to study it

well!
I think that an excessive number of points weakens the
brief, just as the use of slang, sarcasm, personal attacks, and
other irrelevant matters weaken the brief.

Choose three or four

or five strong points, preface them with concise point headings
and proceed to argue how the court below erred.

Support your

conclusions with appropriate authorities and reasoned arguments.
Meet your adversary's argument head-on, describe where you agree
and where you differ, and if you are short on authority for some
point you are making, say so.

Weave the facts of your case into

the law cited in your points, using sentences having subjects and
verbs, and you'll have the makings of a winning brief •

.,<

Oral Arg)lll(ent.

Good appellate advocacy requires good oral

argument as well as good briefing.

It's always amazing to me

/

that an attorney, offered a change to argue, prefers to submit.
On many occasions, my preliminary thinking about a case has been
turned around by oral argument.

Our custom is to allow oral

argument whenever requested, and I urge you to accept the
opportunity it offers to persuade the Court to decide in your
favor.

Although the time allowed for oral presentation is short,

customarily ten or fifteen minutes, it can be used to good
advantage.
The Second Circuit is a red-hot bench.

Each member of the

panel hearing oral argument has read the briefs, and sometimes
there has been an exchange of memoranda among the Judges prior to
the courtroom presentation.

The Judges therefore generally come

to the oral argument with a tentative view of the outcome of the
case.

Many of my colleagues have told me that their tentative

views also have been discarded as the result of oral argument.
Because of our familiarity with the case, there often is a
lively exchange of questions and answers between court and
counsel in the Second Circuit.

It is not unusual for the entire

time allowed for argument to be taken up in this manner.

The

exchange is important, because the Judges use it to resolve their
doubts, clarify their thinking, and, if you watch closely,
sometimes to argue with each other.

XI r g e you

to respond

./

directly to any question asked.

Neve'r say "I'll get to that,
_,//

your Honor."

I've heard that ~onse from several attorneys who

never did get around to answ~ing the question.
Attorneys sometimes react to questions from the bench in
strange ways.

One responded to a question by a colleague of

mine as follows:

"Why did you ask that question, your Honor?"

Obviously, one should not answer a question with a question.

I

am told that the following answer came in response to a question
by a Judge in the Eighth Circuit:

"You wouldn't want to know

that, your Honor."

That didn't go over too well, either.

Sometimes an attorney will not know the answer to a question from
the bench.

Don't "wing it!"

Say you don't know and offer to

furnish the answer after argument in accordance with Rule 28(j)
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
One of the rules of the Supreme Court says something to the
effect that the reading of an argument is discouraged.

It is a

waste or time to read your argument in the Second Circuit as well.
It is too distracting, precludes eye contact with the Judges, and
deprives you of the necessary flexibility to answer questions
from the bench.

Recently, a young attorney read his entire

argument at such a rapid pace that we were loath to interrupt

(

with a question, for fear he would lose his place.

During the

argument, one of my senior colleagues passed me a note in which
he wrote:

"Isn't this Godawful?"

My own impression is that its

a good idea to write out a beginning sentence, an ending sentence
and to set up an outline of everything you want to cover in
between.
The key to effective argument is, of course, preparedness.
I have found the best appellate oral argument in law school moot
court competitions, and that is because the students spend hours
and hours working under supervision on their Briefs and their
oral presentations.

Practicing attorneys seldom have the luxury

of that much preparation.

However, it frequently seems to me

that almost no effort has gone into preparation for oral argument.

I know that some of the larger firms set up an in-house appellate
bench for a moot argument before the real thing.

A law school

professor I recently met at a moot court competition told me that
she was hired by lawyers from time to time to assist them in
preparing for oral argument.

In the final analysis, familiarity

with the facts of your case, as well as familiarity with all the
applicable law, is essential for effective oral argument.

A few

months ago, we heard oral argument from an attorney who was
unfamiliar with a new Supreme Court case that was dispositive of
the matter he was arguing.

The Supreme Court decision had been

issued after the Briefs in his case were filed.

A brief trip to

the Lexis machine prior to his appearance in our Court could have

(

saved him a lot of embarrassment.
Since we do have a hot bench, extensive quotations from the
record or from the authorities is to be avoided.
of valuable time.
principles.
issues.

It is a waste

Also wasteful are discussions of basic legal

Get right to the heart of the case -- the disputed

The Judges will do it if you don't.

At the same time,

you should remember that an attempt to cover too many points may
indicate that you don't have any really strong points.
Nature has provided some people with strong or pleasant
voices.
argument.

Neither is necessary to present an effective oral
However, the presentation must be loud enough so we

don't have to strain to hear it.

The words should be clearly

enunciated, and the presentation should be slow enough for us to

follow it.

There is a microphone in our courtroom and a podium

that adjusts up and down for height.

Lack of height and weakness

of voice therefore are not handicaps in the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals.

However, the attorney must talk directly into the

microphone and not move away from it.

Distracting mannerisms

should be avoided, and emotionalism should be eschewed at all
costs.

You are not talking to a jury when you argue to us.

Finally, be mindful of the tenth commandment promulgated by John

w.

Davis, one of the greatest appellate advocates of all times.

As a matter of fact, I now obey that tenth commandment, which is
this:

"When you are finished, sit down."

